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Abstract 
 
Vietnam's government has implemented a high level protection policy on its domestic 
automobile industry. The paper is to provide an answer to the question whether that policy has 
been successful or not. Using quantitative analysis methods and data collected from various 
sources, we conclude that it up to now has been a failure, in terms of key policy targets and 
welfare surplus. The industry remains 'infant' while both consumer and government lose. The 
research suggests a revision of the protection process and a clarification of government's 
policy objectives. 
 
Key words: protection, local content, Vietnam’s automobile industry 
JEL classification: F13 
 
1 
1. Introduction 
 
Vietnam began its economic renovation in 1986 aimed at industrialization and modernization. 
Similar to many other developing countries, Vietnam’s government regards the automobile 
industry as one of the future growth engines of the economy. In order to develop the industry 
from infant status, the government has implemented many protection measures. The study of 
the impacts of the protection has recently become an interesting topic, especially for the 
policy debate on Vietnam’s automobile industry. 
 
As local content (or 'localization') is one of the key targets oriented by the government, 
Nguyen (2007) studies localization in Vietnam’s automobile industry focusing on the process 
of increasing the value added to automobile products under regional and international 
integration. She indicates that in spite of the protection provided by the government, the 
localization rate of the automobile industry remains below expectations. As a result, she 
concludes that the present policy is unsuitable and ineffective.    
 
In another studies, Fukase and Martin (2000) refer to the automobile industry as an example 
of inappropriate protection in the light of Vietnam's integration into the ASEAN Free Trade 
Area (AFTA). They analyze the case of high tariffs on assembled car imports and conclude 
that protection leads to high production costs rather than high profits. In addition, their 
analysis demonstrates that the government's policy leads to loss on all sides: consumers, 
government and even producers. 
 
In terms of the impacts of protection policy on the automobile industry, similar research has 
been done for Asian developing countries. For instance, Okamoto and Sjoholm (1999) inspect 
the dynamics of productivity growth of the automotive industries (involving automobile and 
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motorcycle) in Indonesia under government protection. They use establishment data which 
are on the entrance and exit from one industry for the Indonesian automotive industries in the 
period 1990-1995 and assert that governmental intervention has caused a low productivity 
performance in Indonesia’s automotive industries. In particular, they argue that the 
government's interference has not been successful in lifting the industry from ‘infant' status.  
 
On the other hand, Lihui (2007) examines the development of China’s automobile industry 
under government intervention, in comparison with China’s free-entry-and-exit computer 
industry. He finds that the automobile industry is more concentrated and less efficient than the 
computer sector. As a result, he suggests that China’s government should encourage 
international competitiveness of China’s automobile firms rather than protect or enforce 
intervention into their operations. 
 
Concerning similar questions, Wonnacott (1965) argues that the government protection leads 
to a significant increase in production costs in Canada's automobile industry. Furthermore, 
Bennett and Sharpe (1979) claim that a protection policy should contain requirements, such as 
local content or export promotion requirement, in order to obtain an effective goal. Some 
other research (see Fleet 1982; Shapiro 1989) support this argument from investigating Latin 
American automobile industries (particularly Brazil, Argentina and Mexico). 
 
Theoretically, Feenstra (2004), Krugman and Obstfeld (2003) argue that whether a protection 
at early stages of an 'infant industry' has any rationale or not depends on the functioning status 
of other markets, such as capital markets. In terms of welfare for the case of a tariff, both 
Feenstra (2004), Krugman and Obstfeld (2003) assert that for a small importing country, a 
tariff always leads to social losses, including terms of consumer surplus loss and the increase 
in marginal costs of production. They argue that for a large country, whether total welfare is 
reduced or not also depends on the level of tariffs imposed.  
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 Taken together, these studies indicate a possible ineffectiveness of protection policy on the 
automobile industry in the early stages. However, previous studies focus on only one aspect 
such as local content (Nguyen 2007), and do not provide much evidence (Fukase and Martin 
2000), or use indirect approaches (Lihui 2007; Okamoto and Sjoholm 1999). Domestically, 
many papers have discussed the right or wrong of Vietnam’s protection policy on the 
automobile industry (see, for example, Vietnam Economics Times, Vnexpress.net, Labour, 
Vietnamnet.net). However, most have been based on qualitative comments on the 
performance of Vietnam's automobile industry without an analysis of the whole impacts. The 
question of whether the protection policies bring benefits to all three sides: domestic 
automobile manufacturers, consumers and the government in terms of each side's targets has 
not been solved by any single paper, using quantitative analysis.  
. 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate impacts on each side including the government, 
consumers and producers, in terms of their targets. Using several approaches involving 
welfare analysis, quantitative synthesis and relevant comparisons, this paper provides 
evidence of the failure of the protection policy on the automobile industry in Vietnam. It also 
suggests that the government – the key side – should review and clarify the appropriate 
targets and strategies for the domestic automobile industry in order to obtain real development 
of the industry and maintain the balance of co-benefits among related sides. 
 
The remainder of the paper is divided into four sections. Section 2 describes the data and 
methodology. Section 3 shows the results obtained from the quantitative analysis. Then, we 
provide some discussion including the policy implications in Section 4. Section 5 is the 
conclusion with suggestions for possible further research. 
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2. Data and Methodology 
 
In order to examine the success of the protection policy in terms of benefits, some research 
uses the labour productivity growth model to investigate impacts of protection (Okamoto and 
Sjoholm 1999), or total factor productivity models to compare the impacts with another 
unprotected industry (Lihui 2007). Some papers use table comparisons to judge policy 
influences (Green 1992). Aiming to provide an overall picture of impacts on all three related 
sides, this paper is based on quantitative analysis without using an econometric model. In 
particular, we use market share analysis, price comparisons, time trends analysis through 
tables, figures, numerical and symbolical examples to support our arguments and 
implications. 
 
Market share analysis is used to analyze the economic performance of Vietnam’s automobile 
firms under protection. We use price comparison mainly in parts of indicating consumer's loss 
due to high price. Analysis on increasing, decreasing trends over time is used frequently in 
this paper through different sections, including the protection process and economic 
performance. Some symbolical and numerical examples are employed primarily in the 
welfare investigation. 
 
Necessary data and information are collected from various sources. Tariffs, non tariff barriers 
and other protection instruments are synthesized from government's regulations, specifically 
by the Prime Minister, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Industry and Trade. Data 
on economic performance of Vietnam's automobile industry mainly come from Reports by 
the Ministry of Industry and Trade and by the Vietnam Automobile Manufacturers 
Association (VAMA). Related data used for comparisons are from Vietnam Statistical 
Yearbooks and other sources, which are cited particularly. However, there are still some gaps 
in the collected data, especially for the price comparisons. This comes from the fact that some 
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car models are produced in Vietnam only and it is difficult to find a similar car in the world 
market in terms of the same engine size and other technical configurations.  
 
3. Results 
 
Results are reported with respect to the protection process and economic performance of 
Vietnam's automobile firms. Those are linked in a logical order to create an overall picture of 
the protection policy on Vietnam's automobile industry. Some implications on the impacts of 
the protection are discussed in Section 4. 
 
Protection policy 
 
 
Traditionally, in order to develop a domestic industry from its infant status, governments 
usually provide protection to that industry, through trade policy instruments: high tariffs, 
quotas and some other non-tariff barriers. A tariff on an imported good, or other tools, is to 
increase the price of that good, in order to protect domestic producers from import 
competition (Krugman and Obstfeld 2003). Even in developed countries, it has been shown 
that a temporarily rational protection on the 'infant period' is sometimes helpful for the 
development of the automobile industry (see, for instance, Lewchuk 1987). However, whether 
the policy is successful or not depends on the suitability of policy targets and instruments 
used along the protection process.  
 
Targets of the policy. In Vietnam, the automobile industry is considered an important 
priority to develop in order to contribute effectively to industrialization, modernization and 
construction of national security and defense (Decision No. 177/2004/QD-TTg). As a result, 
the government issued policies to establish and develop an automobile industry with two main 
targets: satisfaction of the domestic demand and localization ratio, in which the localization 
ratio (or local content rate, value added locally) is the key indicator of an 'infant' or 'mature' 
automobile industry (see Table 1).  
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 Table 1  Targets by 2010 with vision of 2020 of Vietnam's automobile industry 
 
Cars/Trucks Number of autos/Satisfaction of 
domestic demands 
Localization ratio (per cent) 
 2005 2010 2005 2010 
Buses 
(per cent) 
15,000 
>50 
36,000 
> 80 
40 
(15-20 for engine) 
60 
(50 for 
engine) 
Trucks 
(per cent) 
68,000 
>50 
127,000 
80 
>40 >60 
Cars (4-9 seat) 
(per cent) 
3,000 
10 
10,000 
15 
30 >50 
Exports (per 
cent) 
N.A.* 5-10 per cent of 
total turnover 
N.A. N.A. 
 
* N.A.: not applicable 
Source: Vietnam, Prime Minister, 2004. Decision 177/2004/QD-TTg of October 5, 2004 approving the Strategy 
and Plan on development of Vietnam's automobile industry till 2010, with a vision towards 2020, Government, 
Hanoi. 
 
Protection instruments. Since the political events in Russia and Eastern Europe in 1991, 
Vietnam's government nearly suspended importing vehicles. According to the Prime 
Minister's Decision No. 46/2001/QD-TTg 4 April 2001 on management of exports, imports in 
the period 2001-2005, used parts and used under-16-seat ready-made autos were prohibited 
from imports; new under-16-seat ready-made autos were importable under Ministry of Trade's 
permission. In fact, almost all ready-made cars (except some types of trucks and specialized 
autos) consumed in the domestic market in the period from 1991-2005 were through transfers 
from diplomatic agents and staff of international organizations in Vietnam (who were 
permitted to import their personal vehicle to use in their working term in Vietnam). Therefore, 
in another words, the imports of ready-made cars were banned for a long period until 2005 
(for new cars) and 2006 (for used cars). 
 
Since then, under pressure of integration, with commitments within the ASEAN Free Trade 
Area (AFTA) and especially in the World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations, the 
government has opened the domestic market for importation of new and used cars. As a 
result, a tariff is the main protection instrument replacing the barriers and quota limitations. 
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Under the WTO commitments, the average tariff on new ready-made cars must be gradually 
reduced to 70 per cent in 2014 from the bound rate at date of accession of 100 per cent 
(Ministry of Industry and Trade 2006b).  
 
Figure 1    Import tariffs on new cars (ad valorem tariff) 
-
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Decision 98/2005/QD-BTC Decision 70/2007/QD-BTC Decision 85/2007/QD-BTC Decision 13/2008/QD-BTC Decision 17/2008/QD-BTC  
 
Source: Vietnam, Ministry of Finance, 2008. Decisions No. 98/2005/QD-BTC, 70/2007/QD-BTC, 85/2007/QD-
BTC, 13/2008/QD-BTC, 17/2008/QD-BTC on regulation and amendments of import tariffs on new cars, 
Ministry of Finance, Hanoi. 
 
Figure 2  Import tariffs on used 5-seat cars (specific tariff, USD per car, by engine size) 
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Source: Vietnam, Ministry of Finance, 2008. Decisions No. 05/2007/QD-BTC, 72/2007/QD-BTC, 14/2008/QD-
BTC, 23/2008/QD-BTC on amendments of import tariffs on used cars, Minister of Finance, Hanoi. 
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We can see from Figures 1 and 2 that the tariffs for both kinds of imported cars reached the 
lowest rate in 2007. The tariff on new cars was lower than the WTO committed rate in 2007 
(60 per cent, by the Decision No. 85/2007/QD-BTC by Minister of Finance). However, in 
2008 the tariffs for both imported new and used cars have increased again. This was explained 
by the government that it is necessary to limit the number of vehicles by taxes because of the 
current low situation of Vietnam transport infrastructure. Nevertheless, this seemed to reflect 
the short-term vision in the process of policy making in the field of automobile industry. 
 
Unlike some other countries (Li 2000), the local content is not applied as a compulsory 
requirement of imports, but it is still one of the key targets of the government. The imposition 
of import inspection by customs is also not an instrument of protection, however, there is a 
restriction of special automobile import harbors (especially for used cars).  
 
In addition to tariffs, the government used the excise tax as an instrument for protection. 
Domestically manufactured or assembled motor vehicles were originally not subject to excise 
tax until 1 January 1999, in principle. However, to support this infant sector, preferential 
excise tax rates were granted to automobile manufacturing enterprises when investment 
licenses were issued. Local car assembling enterprises had been entitled to a 95 per cent tax 
reduction until the end of 2003, and the reductions could be extended for an additional five 
years for enterprises still incurring losses. Nevertheless, as a compromise between the need to 
support this industry and the potential negative effects that could result from the imposition of 
lower excise tax rates, Vietnam had phased-out the excise tax incentive granted to 
domestically-produced automobiles by the end of 2006.  
 
Table 2   Excise Tax rate for automobiles (as of 1 January 2006) 
 
Automobiles Per cent 
 a) Automobiles of 5 seats or less 50 
 b) Automobiles of 6 to 15 seats 30 
 c) Automobiles of 16 to under 24 seats 15 
 
Source: Vietnam National Assembly, 2003. Law on Excise Tax of 30 June 1990, with amendments of 
5 July 1993, 28 October 1995, 20 May 1998, and 17 June 2003, Hanoi. 
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Economic performance of the Automobile Industry in Vietnam 
 
Market size. Vietnam's automobile industry began in 1991, when the government started the 
open policy, and considered the automobile industry one of the key motivations of the 
economy. Up to now, Vietnam’s automobile industry has 29 manufacturers including 
automobile producers and assemblers, in which there are 12 joint-ventures (FDI) and 17 
domestic ones.  
 
Table 3   List of automobile joint-ventures in Vietnam 
 
Company Home country Company type Start 
VMC (BMW, Mazda, Kia)  Philippines  License Assembler.  1991 
Mekong (Fiat, Iveco, S-Young)  Korea  License Assembler.  1992 
Vidamco (Daewoo)  Korea  Automaker  1995 
Vinastar (Mitsubishi)  Japan  Automaker  1995 
Vindaco (Daihatsu)  Japan  Automaker  1996 
Mercedes-Benz  Germany  Automaker  1996 
TMV (Toyota)  Japan  Automaker  1996 
Ford/Mazda  USA  Automaker  1997 
Hino Motors  Japan  Automaker  1997 
Isuzu  Japan  Automaker  1997 
Visuco (Suzuki)  Japan  Automaker  1998 
Honda  Japan  Automaker  2005 
 
Source: Vietnam Automobile Manufacturers Association, 2008. Monthly reports and Annual reports, VAMA, 
Hanoi. 
 
The FDI firms operate with a total of about USD 1 billion of registered investment capital and 
total production capacity of 150,000 units per year (Vietnam Ministry of Industry and Trade 
reports, 2004-2008). Among domestic producers, there are many state-owned enterprises 
which have a large investment scale in automobile producing and assembling, such as 
Vietnam Engine and Agriculture Machinery Corporation (VEAM), Vietnam Motor 
Corporation (VMC), Saigon-Auto Mechanic Corporation (SAMCO), Vietnam Coal 
Corporation (Vinacoal). Recently, some domestic private companies have been set up, 
creating a larger scale for Vietnam automobile supply, such as Xuan Kien private enterprise 
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and Chu Lai – Truong Hai auto factory. Besides, there are more than 40 local chassis 
assembly enterprises with total assembling capacity of 250,000 units per year.  
 
However, the supporting automobile industry which supplies auto components for assembling 
factories is still far from expectations, in both quantity and quality aspects. Most of the 
component and part auto producers have the small production scale and their products are 
mainly simple, lowly technological, therefore they contribute poor value in the local content 
ratio.  
 
Table 4  Size of automobile market and vehicle ownership in ASEAN countries, 2003 
 
 Per capital 
GDP 
(USD) 
Motor vehicle 
sales (1000s of 
units)  
Motor vehicle 
ownership 
(1000s of units) 
Motor vehicles 
owned per 
(1000 people) 
Vietnam 430  26 592 7.9 
Thailand 2006  409 7691 122.3 
Malaysia 3540 435 5452 240.9 
Indonesia 710 318 5666 26.4 
Philippines 1030 86 2110 27.7 
 
 
Source: Nguyen, T.B., 2007. ‘Industrial Policies as Determinant of Localization: The Case of Vietnamese 
Automobile Industry’,  
http://www.grips.ac.jp/vietnam/VDFTokyo/Doc/34NBThuy21Jul07Paper.pdf (21/07/07). 
 
Table 5  Forecast of vehicles volume in circulation to the year 2010 and 2020 
 
 2002 2003 2005 2010 2020 
Passenger 
car 122,307 149,260 208,831-216,032 380,000-400,000 980,000-1,000,000 
(per cent) (29.00) (29.50) (29-30) (30-31) (35-36) 
Bus  75,383 92,045 133,220 240,000-258,000 530,000-560,000 
(per cent) (17.5) (18.50) (18.50) (19-20) (19-20) 
Trucks  184,638 213,942 309,646 550,000-568,000 1,100,000-1,148,000 
(per cent) (42.5) (44.00) (43) (43-44) (40-41) 
Others  46.835 49,754 61,200 78,000 112,000 
(per cent) (11.00) (10.00) (8.5) (6.00) (4.00) 
Total  429,163 497.541 720,108 1,290,000 2,800,000 
 
Source: Vietnam Ministry of Traffic and Transportation, 2003. Report on development of road in Vietnam, 
Hanoi. 
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Turnover. Before 2005, Vietnam’s automobile firms only imported complete knock down 
(CKD) and incomplete knock down (IKD) kits for assembling with low tariffs (under 30 per 
cent on average, which has remained low until now). In 2005 and 2006, in order to implement 
the WTO commitments, the government permitted imports of new complete build up (CBU, 
or ready-made) cars (in 2005) and used cars (2006).  
 
Table 6   Imported car turnover 
 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Turnover 23,875 22,665 21,635 15,339 17,031 12,619 29,605 
 
Source: Vietnam, Ministry of Industry and Trade, 2008. Report on the automobile industry strategy and plan, 
Ministry of Industry and Trade, Hanoi. 
 
 
Table 7  Domestically produced and assembled auto turnover 2000-2007 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
FDI 13,710 16,926 24,550 41,329 41,000 43,189 31,447   50,952 
Local      780   1,362    3,682   9,307 13,000 24,900 24,992   53,449 
Total 14,490 18,288 28,232 50,636 54,000 68,089 56,439 104,401 
 
Source: Vietnam, Ministry of Industry and Trade, 2008. Report on the automobile industry strategy and plan, 
Ministry of Industry and Trade, Hanoi. 
 
 
By the end of December 2006, joint venture companies had sold 270,000 units of various 
kinds of autos, in which multi-purpose vehicle and sedan are two best-seller types (VAMA's 
reports). This contributed about USD 1.5 million to the State Budget and created jobs for 
about 50,000 people. However, compared with other countries in the region, Vietnam vehicles 
sales are still fairly modest (see Table 4).  
 
Localization. Among FDI firms, only Toyota and Honda reach 20 per cent of the localization 
ratio, all other companies remain from 1.5 to 14 per cent. There are six domestic companies 
having higher localization ratio of 35 – 60 per cent mainly because their products are cheap 
price trucks and buses, which do not require a high technology for secondary parts, except for 
engines.  
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Table 8  Local content rate of VAMA's members 
 
 Automobile companies Brands Local content rate 
   (per cent) 
1  Toyota Motor Vietnam  Toyota  20* 
2  Ford Vietnam  Ford  6,45 
3  Vinastar Motor  Mitsubishi  14 
4  Isuzu Vietnam  Isuzu  12* 
5  Vietnam Suzuki  Suzuki  10 
6  Vietnam Daewoo Motor  Daewoo, GM Daewoo  8 
7  Mercedes-Benz-Benz Vietnam  Mercedes-Benz-Benz  1.5 
8  Honda Vietnam  Honda  20* 
9  Vietnam motors corporation  BMW, Mazda, Kia  12* 
10  Hino Motors Vietnam  Hino  2,06 
11  Vietindo Daihatsu Automotive  Daihatsu  4 
12  Mekong Auto  Fiat, Iveco, Ssangyong  4.6 
13  Saigon Transportation Machinery  Corp.  Samco  40 
14  Truong Hai Auto Corp.  Kia, Daewoo, Foton, Thaco  40 
15  Vietnam Engine Agricultural  Machinery Corp  Veam  40 
16  Vietnam Coal Corp.  Kamaz, Kraz  35 
17  Xuan Kien Private Enterprise  Vinaxuki  60* 
18  Vietnam Motor Industry  Vinamotor  40* 
 
Note: * Nguyen, T.B., 2007. Localization in the integrating process: the case of Vietnamese auto industry in 
http://www.grips.ac.jp.  
Source: Vietnam Ministry of Industry and Trade's Report on Vietnamese automobile industry, 2008. 
 
Price comparison. Table 9 (Appendix) shows some price comparisons, which compare retail 
prices of the same models in the world market (in the USA and other Asian markets 
particularly) and the domestic market for same or similar models. Prices of the assembled cars 
are about 1.7 to 3 times higher than the world price, while prices of the imported cars are about 
2.2 to 3 times higher. The average value of price ratio (domestic price/world price) is 2.31.  
 
4. Discussion 
 
Impacts of protection: gainers and losers 
 
It is relevant to investigate the impacts of protection policy by examining positive and 
negative effects to related beneficiaries, based on their targets or roles. In this part, we try to 
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indicate the impacts that the protection policy has influenced the three sides: consumers, 
domestic manufacturers and government. In addition, other forces may be considered as 
related sides such as automobile importers, transporters or foreign exporters. However, in the 
scope of this paper, we only cover the impacts on the directly related beneficiaries. 
 
Theoretically, a tariff leads to an increase in the price of a good in the importing country and a 
decline of it in the exporting country. Therefore, consumers will gain in the exporting country 
and lose in the importing country. In contrast, producers lose in the exporting country and 
gain in the importing country. Moreover, the government will gain revenue from imposing the 
tariff (Krugman and Obstfeld 2003). That is generally also the case of Vietnam’s automobile 
industry with the behavior of a small importing country.  
 
Consumers. As consumers in a small country where the infant automobile industry is 
protected by high tariffs, Vietnam’s consumers must accept higher prices in comparison with 
the world price. Price contains the components: tariffs + excise tax + value added tax + other 
importation expenses, including commodity inspection charges, bank charges, foreign trade 
agency charges for port entry + other expenses incurred between the time automobiles are 
declared at customs and the time they are sold (Li 2000).  
 
From Table 9 (Appendix), Vietnamese consumers must pay about 2-3 times more than the US 
or other Asian consumers to own the same car. This does not count for the fact that the quality 
standard is lower for the domestic assembled cars in comparison with the one sold in the 
developed market. However, the increase with a high rate of car sales (see Table 7) implies 
more about the relationship between the increasing rates of income, the elasticity of 
automobile demands on price, which is out of the scope of this paper. In addition, in the early 
period when imports of cars were banned (before 2005), the group-monopolistic structure of 
the automobile market (in terms of VAMA's members) made a higher price of assembled 
cars. The import competition created more choices for consumers and contributed to a decline 
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in car prices. However, the results indicate that the protection status with high tariffs remains 
almost unchanged, and car prices in Vietnam remain one of the highest in the world. Thus, 
ignoring the quality aspect, Vietnam’s consumers are the big losers in terms of car price. 
 
Domestic manufacturers. In general, domestic manufacturers are the biggest gainers from 
the protection policy. The high rate of protection allows the domestic automobile industry to 
make additional profits from other sectors of the domestic economy through pricing and 
distribution rents. However, the marginal cost of extra products is increased (Feenstra 2004). 
 
In terms of economies of scale, Maxcy and Silberston (1959) concluded that the efficient use 
of the best assembly techniques calls for a volume of 60,000 units per year, which need not be 
all of one model. There are probably further smaller gains at higher volume but significant 
economies in car assembly appear to be exhausted at about a volume of 100,000 units. Tables 
5 and 7 show that no Vietnam automobile company caught that level of production to have 
economies of scale. In 2007, Vindaco (Daihatsu) was the first automaker exiting the industry, 
and the small market size, or more directly, the economies of scale was one of the main 
reasons for this leaving.  
 
However, the FDI automakers have continued to operate and some other companies have 
continued to enter the industry because they still get profits, in spite of no economies of scale. 
Their profits come from the high price, meaning high protection, rather than the market itself. 
That may be why the FDI automakers do not want to implement their localization ratio 
commitment. They also do not conduct technology transfers as government's expectations, 
because if they invest more in technology, their profits will decline in a short term, and also in 
a long term because the level of economies of scale is much desired. Thus, the industry 
remains 'infant'. 
 
Government. Given that protection reduces competition, the original objective for protecting 
the automobile industry has hindered the inflow of advanced technology and slowed the 
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development of the domestic automobile industry. Furthermore, the shortage of economies of 
scales does not encourage foreign investors to use and improve technology (Li 2000). 
 
Comparing results in Table 8 with the localization targets in Table 1, we find a failure of the 
key targets of the policy. The local content ratio is much lower than expectations, especially for 
tourist cars (from four-to-nine-seat cars). Without economies of scale, FDI automakers 
postpone investing more to improve the local content ratio. They would prefer basing 
themselves on government protection to make a profit to transfering modern technologies from 
home firms. On the other hand, domestic supporting enterprises have small scales to utilize high 
technology to become main supporting firms rather than supplying only low-value parts. 
  
In terms of welfare, a tariff will reduce social welfare in a 'small importing country'. That is 
the case of the Vietnam’s automobile industry. The higher the tariffs, the bigger the welfare 
losses. Therefore, with the protection policy, Vietnam's government has failed to achieve a 
positive net welfare. 
 
Figure 3  Welfare loss of a small (importing) country like Vietnam 
  
Total welfare loss = b + d, in which d is the consumer surplus loss and b is the increase in the 
marginal cost of an extra product. 
 
Source: Krugman, P.R. and Obstfeld, M., 2003. International Economics: theory and policy, 6th edn, Addition 
Wesley, New York: 191. 
 
d b 
Quantity Q 
pw + t 
pw 
a c 
S 
D 
Price, p 
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Again, Vietnam’s domestic market is small, which in turn, obstructs economies of scale. 
Moreover, the large number of models and production fragmentation lead to high costs for 
local component suppliers. The industry then tries to lobby for continuing protection because 
of the high production cost. If accepted by the government, profitability increases for a short-
run, until additional entries reduce profits. When profits come down at a certain level, another 
cycle of lobbying starts. 
 
 
Policy implications  
 
Theoretically, there are two different schemes for different status of domestic auto industry 
and different aims of government (Krugman and Obstfeld 2003). First, in case domestic 
automobile industry is at early stage, the government would aim to develop an auto assembly 
industry first, by temporarily imposing higher tariffs on imported automobiles relatively than 
tariffs on imported parts. Second, in case there is already a mature domestic auto assembly, 
the government would aim to develop an auto parts production, by imposing higher tariffs on 
imported parts relatively than tariffs on imported autos. 
 
Therefore, Vietnam's government should revise the protection process and clarify the most 
suitable strategies and targets for the domestic automobile industry. Then, the government 
would be able to adjust its policy and choose between import substitution and export 
promotion directions for the industry. That has also been the case in many countries at early 
stages of some industries, especially automobile industry. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Using quantitative analysis, the paper investigates the impacts of the protection policy for 
Vietnam’s automobile industry in terms of beneficiaries’ targets. Examining the protection 
process and results of economic performance, we conclude that Vietnam's protection policy 
on the automobile industry has been a failure. Consumers lose from the high prices; the 
government loses in achieving the main targets of the protection policy. Producers also lose 
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from high average costs and sub-optimal economic scale. The automobile industry remains 
'infant' after a long time of earning profits under protection. Therefore, Vietnam's government 
needs to clarify and determine a feasible policy target under the specific conditions of the 
Vietnam’s market.  
 
This paper is limited in an initial analysis of impacts of the protection policy on the three 
mainly, directly related sides: consumers, domestic producers and government. Moreover, 
because of the limitations in data, this paper could not provide a detailed calculation of the 
effective rate of protection in Vietnam's automobile industry and an exact evaluation on the 
total welfare losses occurred from the policy. Therefore further research could collect a more 
detailed, broader data and make a clearer comparison among producer and consumer 
surpluses in order to support the policy debate. 
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Appendix 
Table 9  Automobile price comparison, selected models, 2008 
 
Brand name/models 
Domestic 
price 
(1000 USD) 
Price in the USA/some 
Asian countries 
(1000 USD) 
Price ratio (domestic 
price/world price) 
 Fiat Doblo 20.9 9.9 2.11 
 Albea ELX 19.1 9.1 2.09 
 Albea HLX 21.5 10.1 2.12 
 Ford Ranger XL 4x4 28.6 14.3 2.00 
 Ranger XLT 4x4 31.2 16.6 1.88 
 Escape 2.3 4x4 39.9 22.5 1.77 
 Escape 2.3 4x2 35.9 21.8 1.65 
 Mondeo 2.0  44.4 20.7 2.14 
 Mondeo 2.5 Ghia 51.9 23.3 2.23 
 Everest 4x4 diesel 41.7 20.4 2.04 
 Everest 4x2 petrol 34.2 14.7 2.33 
 Focus 2.0 AT 36 14.2 2.54 
 Focus 2.0 five doors 37.6 15.2 2.48 
 Honda Civic 2.0  37.8 14.6 2.59 
 Civic 1.8 AT  33.6 13.8 2.44 
 Civic 1.8 MT  30 12.2 2.45 
 Isuzu Hi-Lander LX 29.15 13.8 2.11 
 Hi-Lander V-Spec 33.99 17.3 1.96 
 Trooper S 45.1 18.6 2.43 
 D-Max LS (MT) 29.7 14.9 1.99 
 D-Max LS (AT) 31.35 15.5 2.02 
Mercedes-Benz C200K  64.9 23.5 2.76 
C200K Elegance 59.9 21.5 2.78 
C230 Avantgarde 69.9 26.4 2.65 
C280 Avantgarde 69 26.4 2.61 
E200 Avantgarde 86 30.7 2.80 
E280 109 40.2 2.71 
 Mitsubishi Pajero XX 42.9 19.3 2.22 
 Pajero Supreme 52.8 22.9 2.31 
 Grandis 44 20.3 2.17 
 Toyota Innova G 30.1 12.6 2.39 
 Innova J 27.1 11.4 2.38 
 Vios 1.5G  29.2 10.7 2.74 
 Vios 1.5E  26.4 10.0 2.64 
 Corolla Altis 34.4 12.2 2.81 
 Camry 2.4G 51.1 18.6 2.75 
 Camry 3.5Q 66.6 23.3 2.86 
Imported cars    
Hyundai Coupe 49.9 21.3 2.34 
Hyundai Veracruz (petrol) 66.5 29.3 2.27 
Hyundai Veracruz (diesel) 72.9 29.9 2.44 
Hyundai Santa Fe 2.2  46.9 18.6 2.52 
Hyundai Santa Fe 2.7 V6 44.9 18.3 2.46 
BMW 325i 79.8 30.9 2.58 
BMW 525i 126.8 43.5 2.91 
BMW 550i 135.0 58.5 2.31 
Average   2.31 
 
Source: Vietnam Automobile Manufacturers Association, 2008. Monthly reports and Annual reports, VAMA, 
Hanoi; various automakers' websites. 
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